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In many economic situations like R&D races, military conﬂicts, lobbying, or sports,
groups compete for economic rents. In most cases, these groups will diﬀer in many
ways, including size, heterogeneity of the members’ valuations of the rent, or pro-
ductivity. Naturally, all these factors should have an eﬀect on the relative success of
each group to acquire the rent. The inﬂuence of these factors on the relative success
of each group however depends on the way in which groups compete. Focussing on
military conﬂicts, Carl von Clausewitz held the position that“...in modern war one
will search in vain for a battle in which the winning side triumphed over an army
twice its size.” (Clausewitz, 1943, 1834). He acknowledged that there are other fac-
tors like technological superiority (temporarily) inﬂuencing the outcome of a conﬂict,
but if all these variables were stripped away, numbers would determine victory. Fur-
ther research has shown that the advantages from having a larger army have varied
greatly over time (Hirshleifer, 1995). In lobbying contests, there may even be disad-
vantages from larger group sizes, as Olson (1965) argued. His arguments gave rise
to a debate about the so-called group-size paradox, which Esteban and Ray (2001)
deﬁne as: “larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering
their interests” (p.663).
Informal observation shows that individuals pervasively organize in groups in
conﬂicts. In hunter-gatherer societies, individuals were apparently better equipped
to be successful in predator-prey conﬂicts (either as predator or as prey) as well
as in conﬂicts with rivals if they organized in groups (Tainter, 1990).1 Clausewitz’s
observation shows that similar forces exist in modern warfare. But also individuals
engaging in lobbying and rent-seeking activities often organize in groups. Esteban
and Ray (2001) develop one explanation for these facts: larger groups may proﬁt from
cost advantages. If the costs of eﬀort are suﬃciently convex, ceteris paribus, members
of larger groups face suﬃciently lower marginal costs that reverse the group-size
paradox. This is a very important insight that helps to explain the prevalence of
groups in conﬂicts.2
1The same is true for animals who organize in ﬂocks, swarms, packs, etc., see the discussion at
the end of this paper.
2See also Marwell and Oliver (1993); Pecorino and Temini (2008); Nitzan and Ueda (2009,
1The group-size paradox has been extensively discussed in the theoretical and
empirical literature. Agrawal and Goyal (2001) point to the inconclusive evidence:
“[...] scholars writing on the subject have remarked on the ambiguities in Olsons
argument and suggested that the relationship between group size and collective action
is not very straightforward.” However, up to now it is unclear whether the speciﬁc
cause for the possible reversal of the group-size paradox on which Esteban and Ray
(2001) focus, namely convexities in costs, is exhaustive. The starting point of our
paper is to ask if there are additional properties of the conﬂict environment that add
to the explanation of the relative advantage or disadvantage of larger compared to
smaller groups by focussing on the properties of the “production” of group impact.
We believe that those properties are an important factor for the explanation of the
eﬀect of group size in conﬂicts.
We show that two intuitive properties of the ways in which the groups aggregate
their eﬀorts are responsible for its occurrence. The ﬁrst property is an inherent
advantage that may be given by the contest structure to larger groups: If there are
two groups with the same total amount of eﬀort but diﬀerent numbers of individuals,
one cannot in general expect them to have the same lobbying impact. For example,
there may be a diﬀerence in impact whether 10 000 people demonstrate for 10 hours
or 100 000 people demonstrate for 1 hour. The diﬀerent demonstrations may receive
very diﬀerent media attention which in turn may lead to very diﬀerent impacts on
policymaking. If the 10 000 people would have a higher impact, we would expect
the group size paradox to appear more likely. This property of the contest structure
will be called group-size biasedness.
The second important property is returns to scale. Suppose group members in-
crease their eﬀorts by some factor and their relative strength increases by less than
this factor (decreasing returns to scale). This may cause the group-size paradox to
occur even if large groups are advantaged by group size biasedness. Larger groups
tend to be disadvantaged by this because they are facing a larger problem of free
riding. If returns to scale are decreasing, the marginal return of investing more eﬀort
is not large enough to make up for the better possibilities for free riding.
It turns out that if group members have homogenous valuations of winning the
2010).
2contest (which may diﬀer between groups), these two properties completely deter-
mine whether the group-size paradox occurs or not.3 Homogenous valuations are,
however, rarely the case in reality. In general, we would expect to encounter groups
where group members diﬀer in many features: Not only the valuations of winning
may be diﬀerent, but also abilities, qualiﬁcations, or aﬀections. Empirical research
emphasizes that the level of heterogeneity in the group is an important mediator for
the impact of group size (Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1997). Once we introduce heteroge-
nous group members, other factors may start to play a role, such as complementarity
between group-members’ eﬀorts: Groups where agents are heterogenous will often
have the feature that group members have specialized according to their comparative
advantage. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) see such non-additivity as constitutive for
group or team production (pp. 777): “Resource owners increase productivity through
cooperative specialization. [...] With team production it is diﬃcult, solely by observ-
ing total output, to either deﬁne or determine each individual’s contribution to this
output of the cooperating inputs. The output is yielded by a team, by deﬁnition, and it
is not a sum of separable outputs of each of its members.” Despite the fact that there
is a growing interest on the inﬂuence of heterogeneity within and between groups,4
with only a few exceptions the literature on group contests5 has focused attention on
situations where the eﬀort levels of group members are perfect substitutes, i.e. are
aggregated by summation. In order to analyze the group-size paradox for heteroge-
nous valuations, this paper will introduce diﬀerent degrees of complementarity for
the case of a CES-type impact function. If we hold the other properties – group-size
biasedness and returns to scale – at a neutral level, the complementarity between
the eﬀorts of group members determines a minimum valuation a new group member
must have in order for the group-size paradox not to occur.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2 and
cover the case of homogenous group members in Section 3. In Section 4 we allow
3This claim may appear to be at odds with Esteban and Ray (2001) who focus on convexities
in the cost-of eﬀort functions. We will show that their model is isomorphic to a model with linear
costs and nonlinear impact functions that is a special case of our model.
4See Esteban and Ray (2008, 2010).
5The literature on contests between groups has recently been surveyed by Corch´ on, 2007, Section
4.2, Garﬁnkel & Skaperdas, 2007, Section 7, and Konrad, 2009, Chapters 5.5 and 7.
3for heterogeneity of agents and use a CES type impact function to aggregate group
members’ eﬀorts. We characterize the simultaneous Nash equilibrium of the CES
model in Subsection 4.1. In Subsection 4.2 we will show the eﬀect of complementar-
ity on the group-size paradox for heterogenous agents. There will be an extended
discussion of ﬁndings from related strands of the literature in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
Assume that n groups compete for a given rent R. mi is the number of individuals
in group i and k is the index of a generic member of this group. The rent is a
group-speciﬁc public good that has a value vk
i > 0 to individual k of group i. pi
represents the probability of group i = 1,...,n to win the contest. Individuals can
inﬂuence the winning probability by contributing eﬀort xk
i. The members’ eﬀorts
of a group are then aggregated by a function qi(x1
i,...,x
mi
i ). pi is then a function
of these aggregated eﬀorts. Following the literature, we will call qi impact function
and pi contest-success function. We focus on Tullock-form contest-success functions
where the winning probability of a group i is deﬁned as:6









j ), i = 1,...n.
Further, we impose the following assumptions on the individuals:
Assumption 2. Individuals are risk neutral, face linear costs, and maximize their
net rent.


















We are looking for a Nash equilibrium of this game where individuals choose their
eﬀort xk














6An axiomatic foundation for the Tullock function for group contests can be found in M¨ unster
(2009). An interpretation of the Tullock contest as a perfectly discriminatory noisy ranking contest
can be found in Fu and Lu (2008).
4where “∗” refers to equilibrium values and x∗
−xk
i to the vector of eﬀorts by all in-
dividuals except k in group i. In order to facilitate the analysis, we will focus on
situations where a unique Nash equilibrium exists with respect to the total eﬀort
produced of each group. Formally,
Assumption 3. We assume that qi(.) is at least twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and (weakly) monotonic in xk
i ∀i,k. Further, qi(.) is weakly quasiconcave.
This still allows for multiple equilibria within groups as they may arise when
eﬀort levels are for example perfect substitutes.
3 Homogenous valuations within groups
The group size paradox was ﬁrst discussed by Olson (1965), who stated that “the
larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of
a collective good” (p. 35). One particular interpretation of the statement has been
given by Esteban and Ray (2001): In a contest environment in which diﬀerent groups
compete for a rent, larger groups should win with lower probability if the group size
paradox was true. One could however also take a comparative-static perspective on
the group size paradox, which seems to underscore its relevance even better:
Deﬁnition 1. (Group-size paradox) Suppose in a contest there are n groups i
competing for a prize and have mi individuals with equal valuations vi. Then, the
group-size paradox holds strictly (weakly) if and only if adding an individual with
valuation vi to group i will decrease (decrease or leaves constant) the probability of
the group to win the prize.
Next we formulate two intuitive criteria that will turn out to be able to explain
the occurrence of the group-size paradox if individuals of a group have identical
valuations of the rent.
Deﬁnition 2. (Group-size bias) A class of impact functions qm(x1,...,xm) with
m being the number of group members is said to be group-size unbiased if for all





ξ). The impact function is said to be positively group-size biased or nega-
tively group-size biased if qm(x,...,x) < qm ξ(x
ξ ... x
ξ) or qm(x,...,x) > qm ξ(x
ξ ... x
ξ).
5The reason why this property is interesting is that it reﬂects whether a redistri-
bution of the same total amount of eﬀort to more (heterogenous) group members will
lead to an increase, a decrease, or no eﬀect on the impact of the group. For example,
the simple sum of eﬀorts of all group members,
 m
k=0 xk, is group-size unbiased: If
all group members exert the same eﬀort x, then
 m
k=0 xk = m x. Multiplying m by
ξ and dividing x by ξ will then naturally lead to the same result.
Another property of an impact function is whether it has increasing or decreasing
returns to scale:
Deﬁnition 3. (Returns to scale) A class of impact functions qm(  x) is said to have
constant returns to scale if ∀m : qm(ξ  x) = ξ   qm(  x), decreasing returns to scale if
∀m : qm(ξ  x) < ξ   qm(  x), increasing returns to scale if ∀m : qm(ξ     x) > ξ   qm(  x).
Assume that the impact functions have the generalized CES-form













ξ) = ξδ−βqmi(x,...,x) and qmi(λx,...,λx) =
λβqmi(x,...,x), which shows that returns to scale and group-size bias can be in-
dependently chosen.
To show the relationship between our approach and the one employed by Esteban
















with c(...) being an increasing, strictly convex function. The central result is that










is suﬃciently high, the winning probability will strictly increase with group size.
Note that we can write yk
i = c−1(xk
i) where c−1 is the inverse of c. Since by their

















7Their model allows for rival as well as nonrival elements of the rent.
6yields the same solutions as the original problem. We can now focus again on the
case with c(y) = yα, from which we obtain q(xi) =
 
l(xl
i)1/α as the input to the
Tullock impact function.
In the special case that the costs of eﬀort function is equal to (xl
i)α, the group-




isomorphic optimization problem, we can look for group-size bias and returns to
scale of qmi(xi). It is easy to check that positive group-size bias as well as decreasing
returns to scale exist if and only if α > 1. In addition, a decrease in the returns
to scale (as measured by an increase in α) reduces any positive group-size bias:
changing the convexity of costs is equivalent to a simultaneous change in returns to
scale and groups size bias in the isomorphic problem. The result by Esteban and
Ray (2001) imply that if α > 2 the group-size-bias/returns to scale combinations
work in favor of large groups, whereas the opposite is true for α < 2. Given that
this result has been derived in a situation where group-size bias and returns to scale
cannot be disentangled, the question arises as to whether further insights can be
gained if both eﬀects are treated separately.
The following propositions hold (all proofs can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 1. Suppose a contest fulﬁlls Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and the impact
functions are group-size unbiased. Then for constant or decreasing returns to scale
the group-size paradox holds weakly if all groups’ members have equal valuations.
Proposition 2. Suppose a contest fulﬁlls Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and the im-
pact functions have constant returns to scale. Then for negative (positive) group-
size biased impact functions the group-size paradox holds (does not hold) weakly if
all groups’ members have equal valuations.
These results provide a very intuitive explanation when the group-size paradox
arises if group members have the same valuation of the rent. Returns to scale and
group-size biasedness are indeed the main driving forces behind the diﬀerent results
on the group-size paradox by Olson (1965) and Esteban and Ray (2001). If one is
willing to accept the assumption that the impact functions are homogenous, the
above results can be generalized in the following way.
7Proposition 3. Suppose a contest fulﬁlls Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and the impact
functions are homogenous as well as either negatively group-size biased or group-
size unbiased, and have constant or decreasing returns to scale. Then, the group-size
paradox holds weakly if all groups’ members have equal valuations.
The following corollary of the above propositions establishes an interesting spe-
cial case.
Corollary 1. Suppose a contest fulﬁlls Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and the impact
functions have constant returns to scale and are group-size unbiased. Then, the
group-size paradox holds weakly but not strictly if all groups’ members have equal
valuations.
Corollary 1 establishes a link to the case of additively linear impact functions,
which is a special case of an group-size unbiased impact function with constant re-
turns to scale and that have been standard in the literature so far (see, for example,
Baik (2008) and Konrad, 2009, Chapters 5.5 and 7). In this case, equilibrium group
impact and therefore winning probability is independent of group size as the maxi-
mum valuation remains unchanged. Corollary 1 shows that this ﬁnding carries over
to a larger class of impact functions.
The next result covers the case of positive group-size bias combined with de-
creasing returns to scale. Propositions 1 and 2 which cover the boundary cases as
well as Esteban and Ray (2001) suggest that we cannot expect clear-cut results for
this area which in fact turns out to be true. Nevertheless, we get a nice monotonicity
property for the case of homogenous impact functions and equilibria where members
of the same group behave identically.
Deﬁnition 4. For a class of homogenous impact functions, qm(  x), the returns to
scale are measured by the degree of homogeneity r, such that for all m: qm(λ  x) =
λrqm(  x)
Note that this immediately implies that if we speak of a class of impact functions
having certain returns to scale, this means that each of the impact functions of this
class has the same returns to scale. Deﬁnition 5 can be used to deﬁne a measure of
group-size bias:
8Deﬁnition 5. For a class of impact functions, qm(  x), the group size bias is measured
by b(ξ,x,m) = qmξ(x/ξ,...,x/ξ)/qm(x,...,x).
Note that group size bias may change for diﬀerent values of x, m, and ξ. However,
it is immediately clear that for homogenous classes of impact functions, the measure
is independent of x.
Proposition 4. Suppose a contest fulﬁlls Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and the impact
functions are homogenous, positively group-size biased and have decreasing returns
to scale. Consider a change in group i from mi to ξmi group members. If a class of
impact functions qmi has returns to scale r and group size bias b(ξ,x,mi), then:
a) If the group size paradox holds for qmi, it also holds for all ˆ qmi for which ˆ r ≤ r
and ˆ b(ξ,x,mi) ≤ b(ξ,x,mi).
b) If the group size paradox does not hold for qmi, it also does not hold for all ˆ qmi
for which ˆ r ≥ r and ˆ b(ξ,x,mi) ≥ b(ξ,x,mi).
In other words, if for some class of impact functions the group size paradox holds,
then decreasing the returns to scale further or decreasing the group size bias further,
will imply that the group size paradox still holds. The reverse holds for classes of
impact functions for which the group size paradox does not hold: Increasing the
returns to scale or the group size bias will imply that for the new class of impact
functions, the group size paradox also does not hold.
Returning to the special case of a CES-impact function given in (3) and re-
stricting attention to the special case of two groups 1 and 2 with equal valuations
of the rent, vk
i = v, Propositions 1 - 4 can be illustrated as follows. The impact
functions have decreasing, constant, and increasing returns to scale if β <,=,> 1.
Group-size bias is positive (negative) if δ > (<)β. It s straightforward to calcu-










i)2 as well as
the winning probabilities p∗
i for this example. The partial derivative of group i’s
equilibrium winning probability with respect to mi, evaluated at m1 = m2 is then
∂p∗
i/∂mi = (δ − β)/(4mi), which is positive (negative) if and only if the impact
function has positive (negative) group-size bias.
94 Heterogenous valuations within groups
We now turn to the analysis of heterogenous groups and how the complementarity
of the impact functions aﬀect the group-size paradox. Notice ﬁrst that Deﬁnition 1
cannot be used in a framework where group members have diﬀerent valuations of
the rent. For groups that consist of members with diﬀerent valuations, it is not at all
clear what valuation a new member should have. In this case, it is more interesting
to see what the minimum valuation of a new group member has to be in order
to increase the winning probability of the group. Second, we may want to remove
the eﬀects of changing returns to scale and group-size biasedness and introduce
a parameter (γ) to account for diﬀerent degrees of complementarity of the group












, γ ∈ (−∞,1], i = 1,...n.
It is easy to check that this function has constant returns to scale and is group-
size unbiased. Note that we obtain a closed-form solution only if γ  = 0. The Cobb-
Douglas case γ → 0 will be covered by a limit result. It follows from Assumptions






























i refers to the vector x1
1,...,xmn
n without xk
i. In order to have a lean notation,
let yk
i = (xk
i)γ and Yi = (
 
l yl
















Qi+Q/i in the following. While deriving the equilibrium strategies, we will omit the
parameters of these functions for better readability (e.g yk




We will now determine the Nash equilibrium of the given model. Hillman and Riley
(1987) and Stein (2002) have shown that groups/individuals may prefer to stay
inactive if the size of all groups is equal to 1. Baik (2008) has shown that only group
members with maximum valuation participate in a contest for the special case γ = 1.
10Hence, it is possible that some individuals and/or groups will stay inactive in our
setup. We therefore start with an analysis of active individuals and groups and
restrict attention to γ < 1.
Deﬁnition 6. An individual k of group i is said to participate if xk
i > 0. A group i
is said to participate if there exists some k such that xk
i > 0. A group is said to fully
participate if ∀k : xk
i > 0.
Lemma 1. In a Nash equilibrium of a contest fulﬁlling Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 if
a group participates, it fully participates.
Lemma 1 implies that in order to determine whether an individual participates, it










. Without loss of generality, suppose the groups are ordered
such that Vi(γ) ≥ Vi+1(γ) for a given γ. Q∗
i(γ) and Q∗(γ) shall denote Qi and
Q in equilibrium. The following Lemma determines the groups that participate in
equilibrium.
Lemma 2. a) There exist best-response strategies of the members of a group, if and
only if the following group best-response function is fulﬁlled:







b) Groups 1...n∗(γ) participate, where n∗(γ) ≡ argmaxi i such that Vi(γ) > Q∗(γ).
c) If the Nash equilibrium is unique, Q∗
i(γ) and Q∗(γ) are continuous functions for
γ  = 0.
Lemma 2.c is useful for the comparative-static analysis. Given that the number
and identity of active groups depends on γ, it is a priori not clear that aggregate
eﬀort and indirect utilities are continuous in γ. The Lemma reveals that continuity
is in fact guaranteed except at γ = 0. The economic intuition is as follows: Assume
that ˆ γ is a point where a formerly active group becomes inactive or a formerly
inactive group becomes active. The aggregate group eﬀort of the active group is
continuously reduced to zero as γ approaches ˆ γ, and the formerly inactive group
continuously increases its eﬀort from 0 as γ increases from ˆ γ. Hence, there is a
“smooth” fade out or fade in of groups at those points.
11The following proposition characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
For readability, the strategies xk
i are deﬁned as functions of Q∗(γ) and Vi(γ).
Proposition 5. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game characterized by Assump-

























1−γ , Vi(γ) > Q∗(γ)





i=1 Vi(γ)−1 and n∗(γ) is deﬁned in Lemma 2.a and groups are
ordered such that Vi(γ) ≥ Vi+1(γ).






With an explicit solution for Q∗(γ), we can now determine individual expenditures
xk
i
∗(γ) by solving equation (5) using (7). The participation condition of a group is
given by Lemma 2, while Lemma 1 ensures that there does not exist an incentive for
any group member to deviate to xk
i = 0. It was further shown that the ﬁrst-order
conditions return local maxima. Since the system of equations given by the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the participating groups has a unique solution this is indeed the
unique Nash equilibrium.
It is of course interesting to see whether diﬀerent degrees of complementarity
have an eﬀect on the equilibrium if all individuals have the same valuations, i.e.
vk
i = vi∀k∀i. The following corollary of Proposition 5 can then be established.
Corollary 2. If vk
i = vi ∀k∀i the equilibrium eﬀorts of all groups are independent
of γ.
Proof. The corollary directly follows from inserting vk
i = vi into the above deﬁni-
tions, since then Vi = vi.
This ﬁnding implies that an increase in complementarity between group mem-
bers’ eﬀort per se has no eﬀect on the within-group free-rider problem, as could
12have been conjectured from Hirshleifer (1983). A further implication of the result is
that the results on group contests that have been derived in the literature for the
case of perfect substitutes or perfect complements carry over to arbitrary elasticities
of substitution if groups diﬀer only in their valuations of the rent. In particular,
diﬀerent elasticities of substitution will not aﬀect the occurrence of the group size
paradox for homogenous groups.
4.2 Group-size paradox for heterogenous valuations within
groups
It is already clear that the group-size paradox will hold weakly but not strictly
in this model if agents within groups have identical valuations. For heterogenous
agents we can however no longer rely on Deﬁnition 1, since agents with diﬀerent
valuations can be added to the group. It therefore makes more sense to look at how
high the valuation of a new member of the group needs to be to increase the winning
probability of the group.
Proposition 6. For groups with heterogenous valuations, there exists a minimum
valuation a new group member must have in order to raise the winning probability
of its group. This minimum valuation is increasing in the elasticity of substitution
among the eﬀorts of the group members.
This result shows that for heterogenous valuations, a third property of a contest
plays an important role with respect to the eﬀect of the group size on the winning
probabilities: The more complementary the eﬀorts of the group members are, the
lower the necessary valuation of a new member has to be in order to raise the winning
probability. Since heterogeneity in valuations is a rather common feature of interest
groups, the returns to scale, the group size biasedness and the eﬀort complementarity
of the impact function should play a role when analyzing the relative strength of
interest groups.
135 Relationship of our results with other ﬁelds of
the literature
The studies mentioned in the introduction – like Olson’s original argument and
contrary to the speciﬁc interpretation given to it by Esteban and Ray (2001) – do
not speciﬁcally focus attention to situations of conﬂict between groups, and there
are only few strands of the literature that deal with contest-like situations.
The ﬁrst one studies the eﬀect of group size for non-human species8, especially
bird groups and predation. The empirical evidence points in the direction that – for
several reasons and up to a certain limit – larger bird groups are more successful
than smaller ones, for example because larger groups may detect predators sooner
than solitary individuals. Bertram (1980) found that the percentage of time a single
ostrich has its head up is decreasing in group size, but the percentage of time one
or more heads are up is increasing. For the case of wood-pigeons, Kenward (1978)
found that the percentage of successful hawk attacks is decreasing in group size.
An explanation for this positive eﬀect of a larger group-size is the so-called ‘many
eyes hypothesis:’ All members of a group are alerted if at least one member detects
a potential predator9 or the fact that it is harder for the predator to focus on a
speciﬁc prey if the group is large. Cresswell and Quinn (2004) and Kenward (1978)
analyzed Sparrowhawk attack success when hunting Redshanks and found that the
probability of capture of Sparrowhawks increased when the group size of their prey
decreased. This ﬁnding suggests that there are positive eﬀects of group size for the
prey in predator-prey contests. Translated into the formal language of our model and
with the necessary prudence, the group advantage can be interpreted as a speciﬁc
property of the contest that cannot be reduced to some form of strictly convex
8Which of course implies that one has to be suﬃciently cautious with respect to the implications
for models based on the utility maximization paradigm. The seminal contribution to game theoretic
application to animal behavior is Smith and Price (1972). For a critical comparison of models of
utility maximization and Nash equilibrium as solution concept with models of ﬁtness maximization
and evolutionary stable strategies as solution concept in contests see Leininger (2003).
9Pulliam, Pyke, and Caraco (1982) found that individuals in groups use a ‘conditional vigilance
strategy’ where individuals are cooperatively vigilant as long as all other group members remain
so too (tit-for-tat); this implies that individuals monitor the behavior of others.
14costs-of eﬀort function but can better be explained by impact functions leading to
some form of group-size bias and/or economies of scale. The main driving force for
these positive eﬀects, however, does not necessarily stem from the contest situation;
the decrease in successful attacks may be a useful byproduct of some other positive
eﬀects. In order to test this, Beauchamp (2004) examined ﬂock sizes of species living
on islands where predation risk is either absent or negligible with ﬂock sizes of the
same species on the mainland (with higher predation risk). Controlled for other
potential explanatory factors like population density, habitat type, food type, etc.,
mean and maximum ﬂock size were smaller on islands than on the mainland. The
results suggest that predation is a signiﬁcant factor in the evolution of ﬂocking in
birds. The ‘many eyes hypothesis’ and the increasing diﬃculty of the predator to
focus on prey in larger groups closely resemble a type of non-additive impact function
with positive group-size bias.
There is also a lively discussion about the prevalence of a group-size paradox
in contest environments in the sociological as well as the strategic-management
literature with (as can be expected from Esteban and Ray (2001) as well as this
paper) mixed empirical evidence. Siegel (2009) argues that in large groups, the
large number of ties between group members can hamper collective action. Larger
groups require more specialization to eﬀectively manage the increasing complexity
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and to allow for eﬀective decision-making procedures
(Benbasat and Lim (1993). The in general smaller diversity of members of smaller
groups makes it easier to coordinate on shared goals and collective action (e.g.
Gamson, 1995, Klandermans & deWeerd, 2000, Monge et al., 1998). It is also easier
to speak with one voice if the group is smaller, avoiding inconsistent messages which
are counterproductive for the success in any lobbying process (Dominelli, 1996),
which implies that there must be a certain degree of complementarity between the
group members’ eﬀorts. Using data from Swedish ﬁrms, Wincent, ¨ Ortqvist, Eriksson,
and Autio (2010) found evidence for the predicted adverse eﬀect of group size on
the amount of fundraising. Economies of scale and group-size bias therefore tend to
favor smaller groups in these situations. However, there are also opposite ﬁndings.
For example, the mere number of group members may give the group more media
coverage and/or political power (McAdam, 1882), pointing to a positive group-size
bias. Larger groups may also be able to provide more funds (Oliver, 1993, Zald
15& Ash, 1966). A study by McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) showed that in fact the
size of task committees had a positive eﬀect on the amount of funding obtained
in campaigns for local governments. Finally, Dejean, Penard, and Suire (2009) ﬁnd
a positive relation between the size of a community and the amount of collective
good provided (with decreasing individual propensity to cooperate) in an empirical
analysis of P2P ﬁle-sharing communities, a result that is strikingly similar to the
ﬁndings about individual and group vigilance of birds mentioned above.
6 Concluding remarks
According to our model one can expect that four crucial “technological” factors
determine the role of group size on the outcome of a group contest, group-size
biasedness, returns to scale, and complementarity between group members’ eﬀorts
as well as the composition of their valuations in case of heterogenous valuations
within groups. These ﬁndings complement and extend the results by Esteban and
Ray (2008, 2010) who have shown that the convexity of individual cost functions
may explain the reversal of the group-size paradox, and it turns out that convexity
in costs is a special case of positive group-size bias.
Empirical ﬁndings support the existence of a group-size paradox, but as noted
by Marwell and Oliver (1993), it also stands in contrast to a signiﬁcant body of
empirical ﬁndings pointing to a positive relationship between group size and group
performance in conﬂicts. Our analysis reveals that this diverse empirical pattern may
not be reduced to only one explanatory variable, namely the degree of convexity
in costs. To continue the example from the introduction, the success of political
demonstrations may depend on media coverage which in turn may depend on the
number of demonstrators. This is an example of group-size biasedness that cannot
be reduced to convexities in costs.
Our analysis of within-group heterogeneity, a constellation that should empir-
ically rather be the rule than the exception, shows ﬁrst that the composition of
individual valuations is in fact important for contest success. Second, the degree of
complementarity in reaching impact becomes important. The higher the degree of
complementarity, the lower the threshold an individual valuation has to reach in
16order to have a positive impact on group success. This ﬁnding sheds light on the
empirical ﬁndings stressing that heterogeneity is likely to have adverse eﬀects on the
contribution to the group-speciﬁc public good (Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2005).
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose we have for all groups a group-size unbiased impact function q.
Denote by Q∗ and Q∗
/i the total impact of all groups and of all groups except group
i in equilibrium. By Assumption 3 there exists a Nash equilibrium that is unique
up to redistributions among the group members and that is characterized by the







Q∗2vi − 1 = 0 ∀i,k (A.1)
It is evident from the FOC that the equilibrium is symmetric among members of a
group and we thus only need to focus on fulﬁlling the FOC of the ﬁrst member of
each group. By assumption, the impact function is group-size unbiased. For equal
inputs we can then write q(xi) = g(x1
i   mi), since otherwise the functional equation






i   mi)   mi is not the correct partial derivative. However, we
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i   mi) (A.4)
for ∆ → 0. We can reinsert this expression into the FOC and replace Q∗
/i/Q∗ by
(1 − p∗
















17We can now prove by contradiction that mi and p∗
i cannot rise at the same time.
Suppose this would be the case. For the behavior of Q∗, we can now distinguish
three cases, Q∗ increases, remains constant, or decreases.




increases, as otherwise p∗
i would not increase. Since Q∗
i increases if and only if xk
i
∗ mi
increases, the left-hand side (LHS) of (A.5) must decrease, as g′(...) is a decreasing
function. But the fact that Q∗ and p∗
i increase, implies that the right-hand side
(RHS) increases, which means the FOCs cannot be fulﬁlled.
Second, suppose Q∗ remains unchanged. This implies that the RHS of (A.5)
increases, which in turn implies that xk
i
∗   mi falls. But if Q∗
i decreases, Q∗ must
decrease as well, since p∗
i increases. Q∗ can thus not remain constant.
Third, consider Q∗ decreasing. Since p∗
i is increasing, there must exist a group j
where p∗
j is decreasing. Take the FOC of this group j: Since Q∗ is decreasing and p∗
j
is decreasing, the RHS is decreasing. This implies that xk
j
∗   mj is increasing which
means Q∗
j is increasing and thus p∗
j as well. This contradicts the assumption that
there exists a group where p∗
j is decreasing for decreasing Q∗. If there is no group
with decreasing probability, p∗
i cannot be increasing.
Since for all possible cases of behavior for Q∗, there arises a contradiction from
the assumption that p∗
i increases when mi increases, it is established that p∗
i weakly
decreases in mi under the given assumptions.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It is convenient to summarize the following properties in a Lemma.
Lemma B.1. If qmi(.),qmi+1(.) have constant returns to scale and negative (positive)
















is invariant in the level of eﬀort of a group.
Proof of Lemma. Due to constant returns to scale, we have q(a   xi) = a   q(xi),




is homogenous of degree zero in xi. Using the symmetry
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indeed invariant in the level of eﬀort as expected for constant returns to scale in a









i   (mi + 1)
holds. Suppose that β =
mi+1





i   (mi + 1)
=
h(ˆ x1
i,β   mi)
ˆ x1
i   β   mi
. (B.1)
By constant returns to scale, (B.1) can be written as:
h(ˆ x1
i,β   mi)
ˆ x1





β ,β   mi)
ˆ x1
i   mi
,





i mi . This implies that ∂q(ˆ xi)/∂xk
i is indeed decreasing (increas-
ing) in mi for a symmetric equilibrium.  







Q∗2vi − 1 = 0 ∀i,k. (B.2)
We want to establish that a joint increase in mi and p∗
i in equilibrium leads to a










we know that Q∗ must decrease if mi and p∗
i increase, since by Lemma B.1. the LHS
is decreasing in mi and invariant in x1
i
∗ for every given symmetric equilibrium. The
19RHS is increasing in p∗
i. For the FOC to hold, Q∗ must then decrease. Note that an
increase in p∗
i implies a decrease in p∗
j for at least one group j. Looking at the FOC










As we know, the LHS is constant for given group size mj. The RHS however is
both increasing in p∗
j and Q∗. Since both are decreasing, the FOC can no longer be
fulﬁlled, which yields the contradiction.
The proof for positive group-size bias is similar. We again start with FOCs of an







Q∗2vi − 1 = 0 ∀i,k. (B.5)
We want to establish that an increase in mi and a decrease in p∗
i in equilibrium leads










we know that Q∗ must increase if mi increases and p∗
i decreases, since by Lemma
B.1. the LHS is decreasing in mi and invariant in x1
i
∗ for every given symmetric
equilibrium. The RHS is increasing in p∗
i. For the FOC to hold, Q∗ must then
increase. Note that a decrease in p∗
i implies an increase in p∗
j for at least one group











As we know, the LHS is constant for given group size mj. The RHS however is
both increasing in p∗
j and Q∗. Since both are increasing, the FOC can no longer be
fulﬁlled, which yields the contradiction.
20Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let ρ be the degree of homogeneity. Euler’s Theorem for homogenous func-








, which boils down to
qmi(xi) =








for a symmetric equilibrium, which can (again for a symmetric equilibrium) alter-





ρ   qmi(xi)
mi   xk
1
. (C.2)
(Weakly) negative group-size biasedness implies qmi(xi) ≥ qξ mi(xi/ξ). Using (C.2)
this inequality can be expressed as
qmi(xi) =




































Assume that ξ = (mi +1)/mi. The ﬁrst-order condition of a representative member
















in equilibrium. We can now prove by contradiction that mi and p∗
i cannot rise at
the same time. Suppose this would be the case. For the behavior of Q∗, we can now
distinguish three cases, Q∗ increases, remains constant, or decreases.
Suppose Q∗ increases. The increase in p∗
i also implies that Q∗
i has to increase.
For ﬁxed Xi =
 
xk
i, the deﬁnition of group-size biasedness implies that q(xi) goes
down. In order to be consistent with the increase in Q∗




has to go up.
The above assumptions imply that the RHS of (C.4) increases. For this to be an




21(C.3) implies that ∂q(xi)/∂xk
i goes down. (Weakly) decreasing returns to scale imply
that ∂q(xi)/∂xk




i has to go down to reestablish the equality, a contradiction.
Second, suppose Q∗ remains unchanged. The contradiction follows along the
same lines as before: An increase from mi to mi + 1, (C.3) implies that ∂q(xi)/∂xk
i




i goes up, the LHS of (C.4) goes up. To
reestablish the equality it follows that Xi =
 
xk
i has to go down, which c.p. reduces
Q∗
i, and for Q∗ being constant, has to increase Q∗
j for some j. This is, however,
inconsistent with the conjecture that p∗
i increases.
Third, consider Q∗ decreasing. Since p∗
i is increasing, there must exist a group j
where p∗
j is decreasing. Take the FOC of this group j: Since Q∗ is decreasing and p∗
j
is decreasing, the RHS is decreasing, which implies that the LHS has to decrease.
In addition, Q∗




j increases, which is inconsistent with the requirement that Q∗
j has to go
down.
Appendix D: Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. From group size unbiasedness we know that (A.4) holds. Due to constant
returns to scale, g′(x1
imi) is a constant. The LHS of the ﬁrst order condition (A.5)
is thus constant. Suppose now pi rises (falls) with a change in mi. Then for the ﬁrst
order condition to still hold, Q∗ needs to fall (rise). Also, the winning probability
of at least one other group pj needs to fall (rise). A fall (rise) in both Q∗ and pj is
however incompatible with the ﬁrst order condition of group j. Therefore, both pi
and Q∗ need to remain constant.
22Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We assume throughout that we are in a symmetric, interior equilibrium. By
homogeneity of degree ri, we have from Euler’s theorem








ri   qmi(xi)
mi   xi
=
ri   qmi(1)
mi   (xi)1−ri. (E.2)
By the deﬁnition of group size biasedness we have that a function is positively group
size biased, if qmi(xi) < qmiξ(xi/ξ). In the homogenous case, this is equivalent to


















Clearly, if bi(ξ) > 1, q is positively group size biased.10 For homogenous functions,
qmiξ can be uniquely determined by bi(ξ), qmi, and ri. We can derive two helpful
























We now compare two classes of impact functions, q and ˆ q for which bi(ξ) > ˆ bi(ξ)
for some11 ξ and ri = ˆ ri.
10Note that this measure is a local measure which depends on ξ. A function that is positively
group size biased for some increase in members may be negatively group size biased for others.
11Alternatively we could assume that this condition holds for all ξ, from which we could derive
the result that if the group size paradox holds for all ξ under q, then it must hold for all ξ under
ˆ q as well.
23Suppose that the ﬁrst-order condition holds for the impact function qmi at x∗
i.
After adding miξ −mi group members and employing the impact function qmiξ, let
the equilibrium contribution be x∗
i,ξ. Similarly, denote by ˆ x∗
i, ˆ x∗
i,ξ the equilibrium
eﬀorts when using impact functions ˆ qmi and ˆ qmiξ, respectively.







∂xi . The ﬁrst-order condition of an interior







i (1 − p∗
i)
. (E.7)









i (1 − p∗
i)
. (E.8)
Suppose the group-size paradox holds. Then we can see that for an increase in mi,
the LHS of the equation has to decrease. This follows since an increase in the LHS
would imply that on the RHS Q∗ must rise, because by assumption p∗
i decreases.
Since p∗
i decreases and probabilities must sum to one, there must exist another group
j, for which pj increases. But then the RHS of the ﬁrst order condition of group j
must increase and since Q∗ increases, q∗
j and thus x∗
j must increase as well. However,
the LHS is decreasing in xj, implying that there does not exist xj such that the ﬁrst-










i.e. the LHS of the ﬁrst-order condition of group i has to be lower in the new
equilibrium. Similarly, it can be derived that if the winning probability does not














We will now assume that the group-size paradox holds for q, but not for ˆ q and
show that this yields a contradiction. Combining the above properties of the partial
derivatives of qmi,qmiξ with equation (E.9) and remembering that the derivative of































Similarly, with the inequality reversed (since we assume that the group size paradox









Combining these two inequalities via the assumption that q has a greater group size





























i,ξ could not be a best response12. Together with bi(ξ) > ˆ bi(ξ), we
conclude that ˆ qmiξ(ˆ x∗
i,ξ) < ˆ qmi(ˆ x∗
i). This contradicts the assumption that the group-
size paradox does not hold for ˆ q, since then a lower ˆ q would have to yield a higher
winning probability, in which case ˆ x∗
i could not be a best response.
The reverse argument, stating that if we increase group size bias, the group size
paradox cannot hold if it did not held before can be derived by reversing inequalities
in E.13 above. The proof for a change in ri > ˆ ri for bi(ξ) = ˆ bi(ξ) now follows the



















1−ˆ ri is strictly












12To see this, note that the winning probability is higher for a group impact qmi(x∗
i). Since group
impact is increasing in xi, it would be proﬁtable for some group member to choose xk
i < x∗
i,ξ
25From here, the same argument as above applies and therefore if the group size
paradox holds for q with returns to scale ri, then it must hold as well for ˆ q with
returns to scale ˆ ri < ri. The reverse argument again follows from reversing the
inequalities in (E.15) and assuming ˆ ri > ri.
Appendix F: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We ﬁrst check that the interior solution is a local maximum. The FOC of the

































Solving the FOC for vk
i and inserting the expression into the second-order condition

















which holds for all γ ∈ (−∞,1). Therefore, all solutions of the FOCare local maxima
taking the other players’ strategies as given. The best responses are either given by
the solution to the FOC, or by a corner solution. From equation (4) it is clear that
the only possible corner solutions are non-participation with xk
i = 0. We thus need
to verify that whenever the best response of one member of the group is given by
the solution to the FOC, it is not possible for any member of the group to have the
best response xk
i = 0. First, we will show that whenever there exists a solution of
the FOC for one individual of a group, it exists for all individuals: From the FOCs
of two representative group members l, k we obtain the within-group equilibrium
condition:















26for all members k,l of group i. Both, the LHS and RHS of (F.4) are strictly increasing
in yk
i , yl
i if γ ∈ (0,1). For γ ∈ (−∞,0) both LHS and RHS of (F.4) are strictly
decreasing in yk
i , yl
i. Thus, for each yk
i there exists a yl
i such that the within-group
equilibrium condition holds. Since for all group members the LHS of (F.1) is equal,
there exists a positive solution to the FOC for either all group members or none.
Second, we need to show that xk
i = 0 is not a best response if it is a best response
for another individual l in the group to play xl
i > 0. We do so by contradiction:
Obviously, for a corner solution with xk
i = 0 and xl


























i)γ−1 converges to ∞ if xk
i → 0, which contradicts the above inequality if
Q/iQi/Q2Yi > 0. Given that xl
i > 0 and the structure of the CES-impact func-
tion, Qi > 0, Yi > 0, and it cannot be an equilibrium that no group participates.
To complete the proof, note that from the fact that there is an individual l in the






















































which is a contradiction for all γ < 1. Thus there does not exist an equilibrium
in which for one player in the group a corner solution at zero eﬀort investments is
obtained while for another an interior solution holds.
27Appendix G: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If there exists a solution to the FOC, it is characterized by the following
equation, obtained by solving (F.4) for yl






























γ > Q/i. Note
that this condition is the same for all members of a group. In all other cases, we get
yk
i = 0 for γ ∈ (0,1) and yk
i = ∞ for γ ∈ (−∞,0) as was to be expected since both
cases correspond to xk
i = 0. In these cases we have ∀l : yk
i = yl
i by equation (F.4)





i = 0. We can write a group
best-response function as







establishing part a), since by Lemma 1 either for all group members we obtain an
interior solution or for none. Since the best-response function is continuous in γ  = 0
and in the strategies of the other groups Q/i, if a unique Nash equilibrium exists,
the equilibrium strategies must also be continuous in γ. This establishes part c) of
Lemma 2. What remains to be shown is which groups participate in equilibrium.
Suppose a group ζ participates in equilibrium with strictly positive eﬀort, while a
group ζ + 1 does not participate. Let Q∗
i(γ) be Qi in equilibrium (we ignore here
that these are best responses and should thus be functions of Q∗
/i) and let the other
variables introduced above be deﬁned correspondingly in equilibrium. Then by the







Since by assumption Q∗
ζ+1(γ) = 0, we have Q∗
/ζ+1(γ) = Q∗(γ). Solving (5) for Q/i








We now insert (G.5) into the ﬁrst equation of (G.4) and the condition ˆ Q/ζ+1 = ˆ Q





in equilibrium. It follows that Vζ(γ) > Vζ+1(γ). We can thus order the groups such
that Vi(γ) ≥ Vi+1(γ) and deﬁne n∗(γ) as the group with the highest index number
that still participates with strictly positive eﬀort. By (G.6), all groups i ≤ n∗(γ)
participate. This establishes part b) of Lemma 2.
Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 6

























. Since the winning probability increases in Vi,























This condition yields after solving:
v
x
i ≥ Vi. (H.3)
Notice, if we substitute θ =
γ
1−γ, Vi(θ) is a power mean with the exponent ranging
over θ ∈ (−1,∞) where the greatest lower bound is given by γ → −∞ and the
least upper bound given by γ → 1. It follows from the power-mean inequality that
the power mean is weakly increasing in its exponent θ and strictly increasing in θ
29if there are two distinct vk
i  = vl
i (Bullen (2003), chapter 3). Since θ is an increasing
function of γ, Vi is strictly increasing in γ. This in turn implies that the minimum
valuation a new group member must have in order to raise the winning probability
of this group is also increasing in γ.
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